Purpose -To disseminate the lessons learned from the successful deployment of a Wave Energy Converter (WEC) and accelerate growth in the field of ocean energy.
testing rarely completely duplicates real conditions; by introducing the system to real conditions during the prototype period, real risks can be better identified and mitigated at a lower cost both intellectually and financially. The important aspects of testing in a real sea environment include proving the robustness of modeling, both in scale and in software, and equipment, initially and over time.
To date, there have been relatively few real environment projects like CORES in which the outcomes and results from the project can be published with relative freedom, a situation which provides a unique learning and dissemination opportunity. Similar projects include the Pico Island OWC in Portugal (Sermento et al., 2006) , the LIMPET OWC on the island of Islay, Scotland (Boake et al., 2002) , and the Mighty Whale in Gokasho Bay, Japan (Washio et al., 2000) . The project itself and each of the commissioning phases presented many unique challenges that had to be met and overcome before, during and after final deployment. This paper aims to highlight these challenges and how they were met so that the experience and lessons learned during the CORES project can be passed on to future projects of similar scope and help to ensure that they are carried out as smoothly and successfully as possible.
While this was ultimately a research project, an industrial approach was applied -to the greatest extent possible within a diverse partner group -in the coordination, development and implementation of the field trials, in order to minimise risk and optimise research output, particularly in the context of an offshore deployment involving research teams with limited operational experience in this domain. This industrial approach included the following steps:
 a consistent and regular communication plan during the project design phase.
 a phased approach to system commissioning involving laboratory component and subsystem testing, onshore integration testing and offshore commissioning and test planning.
 a coherent and disciplined documentation methodology applied to all testing plans, procedures and results, as well as rigorous change tracking.
In Section 2, an overview of the OWC system is provided. This is followed by two sections that address the commissioning process pre-and post-offshore deployment. The final section addresses specific issues related to sensors and data.
System Overview
The fundamental converter type utilized in the CORES project operates on the principle of the OWC.
An OWC is a wave energy converter with a submerged opening and a hollow structure containing a volume of water and an air-water interface (Evans, 1978; O'Sullivan and Lewis, 2008; Pervisic, 2005) . The OWC used in this project was a backward bend duct buoy (BBDB) as shown in Figure 1, while Figure 2 shows the CORES OWC shortly following deployment. The waves impinging on the buoy, as well as the motions of the device itself due to wave action create resultant hydrodynamic pressure fluctuations at the mouth of the water column, which is open to the sea as illustrated. These pressure fluctuations induce an oscillatory motion in the water column inside the OWC which in turn cause a reciprocating airflow across an air turbine connected to an electrical generator. In the case of the CORES project the air turbine used was a moveable guide vane controlled impulse turbine (Setoguchi et al., 2001) although Wells turbines can also be utilized (Raghunathan, 1995; Setoguchi and Takao, 2006) . The main components developed specifically for the CORES system were the air turbine and associated moveable guide vanes, the electrical power system, the control system, the data acquisition system, the sensors, the communications system and the mooring system. The integration of these elements in the CORES system and on the floating OWC platform is shown in Figure 3 . Table 1 shows a schedule of equipment used in the CORES power and SCADA systems. The decision to use off-the-shelf components for this project was influenced by results from previous, similar system deployments during the original testing of the Ocean Energy Ltd. Platform (O'Sullivan et al., 2011) . 
Power Take-off System
The power take-off (PTO) system consisted of an impulse turbine, 3-phase squirrel cage induction generator, and a full back-to-back frequency converter. This allowed the generator to be controlled by a variable speed electrical motor drive, while the output of the system was a 3-phase, 400 VAC (L-L), 50 Hz signal. The output of the frequency converter was connected to the emulated 3-phase grid system within the control room that was maintained by three SMA Sunny Island inverters. The inverters were all connected to the 24 VDC battery bank on board. This type of system was necessary because the test site did not have a grid connect cable hence the grid and power control had to be emulated onboard. This on board power take-off system is shown in During generation, the energy generated by the PTO system was used to power the entire electrical load within the OWC and charge the battery bank through the three inverters. Excess power was dissipated in two resistive loads, controlled by SMA smart load controllers. The advantage of such a three-phase power system is that it emulates a real grid connection and enables the system control and operation to be scaled directly to a full scale device.
When there was not enough energy in the waves for electricity generation, the energy stored in the batteries was used to keep the entire system in an idle state maintaining communication with the shore and allowing the system to easily transfer back to generating. During extended periods of calm seas, the diesel generator was triggered to recharge the batteries when the charge dropped below critical levels.
RTIMS and SCADA System
The Real Time Information Management System (RTIMS) and Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) System were critical parts of the CORES project. They included all of the monitoring and control hardware and software, as well as communication devices. A Beckhoff programmable logic controller (PLC) served as the system supervisory controller and sensor data acquisition system. The PLC could be accessed by the panel mounted PC through the local Ethernet interface and also remotely via the internet from any PC. The PLC and the panel PC were connected to the local network on the buoy along with the four on-board cameras and the web box of the three-phase Sunny Island power inverters. The local network, illustrated in Figure 5 , was connected to an internet router onshore at a local hotel via a wireless radio link. A 3G router was also on the network for internet connection redundancy. The SCADA system was integrated within the PC; this included sensor data and control variables read by the PLC, as well as data collected by the Sunny Island inverter system, the weather monitoring station, and the gyroscopic position monitor. A database was created in the on board PC and was connected to an offsite data processing and storage server via a cloud computing network.
Also included in the SCADA/PLC/PC system was the ability to restart the PLC or the PC remotely via SMS. An SMS could be sent to a mobile phone number registered to a SIM card inserted in the 'Yoke' device. The Yoke is a modified GSM mobile phone system with several programmable relays and digital inputs. These programmable relays were used to control power to both the PLC and PC. This in effect gave the ability to remotely restart either system in the event of software freeze. The flow of data, including the Yoke system, is illustrated in Figure 6 . 
OE Buoy safety system
The OE Buoy safety system was comprised mostly of the general safety and protection systems for the floating buoy. This included the bilge water level sensors, alarm system communications, GPS sensors (for device drift monitoring), the bilge pumps, and a charging inverter and separate battery bank that powered the safety and protection systems. The only connection between the OE Buoy system and the rest of the systems in the buoy was through the diesel generator. This safety system was kept separate to ensure that any problems that might arise with the complex RTIMS and power take-off systems would not compromise the safety systems on the buoy.
This isolation proved to be crucial, as there were several instances when the RTIMS and Power Systems were down, while the OE safety system was never without power ensuring that any alarms could always be transmitted to shore.
System Test and Commissioning
The testing and commissioning of the system, as illustrated in Figure 7 For the week long testing at the HMRC, the ABB frequency converter, Sunny Island inverters, batteries, load controllers, the full panel, including PLC and PC, and most of the sensors were available and assembled in the laboratory. The power take-off system was assembled in the laboratory as shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 : the latter is a photo of the controlled motor-generator test rig at the HMRC, which was used to simulate the turbine, and the available generator was used in the absence of the actual system generator. A single phase from the local grid was used in place of the diesel generator to recharge the batteries when necessary. In this way, the power take-off system, as well as the generator control system and PLC process control could be tested in the laboratory despite the unavailability of the turbine, designed by Kymnar, and generator system, designed by
Tecnalia, which was being tested separately at the offices of project partners. It was very beneficial to the project to be able to perform the bulk of this system testing within a laboratory before marshalling the equipment to the dock side site in Galway where installation would take place. This allowed for better troubleshooting, easier development of system changes, and general project documentation updates. The lab testing also allowed engineers from several of the partner organisations to work together in a less pressurised and stressful environment than is typically found during site work, and allowed the team to become familiar with each other and the system as a whole before beginning the onsite work. The logistical difficulties in timeline coordination and equipment gathering meant that some subsystems could not be pre-site tested. This led to some integration issues, the majority of which were addressed and corrected during the onsite dry dock commissioning and testing stage of the project, albeit at higher cost and time input.
Motor Coupling Generator
As with any build of this scale, there were problems encountered during the installation and commissioning process that had to be addressed before the OWC was ready to be deployed at sea.
The most significant problems arose during the integration of the non-lab-integrated subsystems.
Movable Guide Vanes and Hydraulic System
The most daunting challenge during the build and commissioning phase came when integrating the turbine hydraulic powerpack with the onboard power system. The purpose of the hydraulic system was to move the turbine guide vanes between two positions to facilitate optimum airflow profiles in both directions of airflow, and hence enhance overall efficiency (Thiebaut et al., 2011) . The movable guide vane system can be seen in Figure 10 , which is a photograph taken after decommissioning. The hydraulic power pack was designed with a single-phase 2 kW electric motor driven pump. The pressurized hydraulic oil was used to actuate a driving rod that drove the guide vanes to one of two positions. The guide vanes were all connected via rings that assured that all the vanes moved together. The hydraulics were rigorously tested in the development laboratory in Portugal.
However, it could not be tested with the rest of the power systems for logistical reasons and on testing Driving Rod
Connecting Rings
Guide Vanes at the dock side it was found to be incompatible with the ac power inverters on board the OWC, as these could not source the high transient startup currents required by the pump motor. The hydraulics had to be slightly redesigned, and a complete overhaul of the hydraulic electrical supply was required, with significant time and cost implications. The following is a step-by-step account of the problems encountered and solutions proposed during commissioning and redesign of the hydraulic power pack and movable guide vanes.
 hydraulic pump powered from single phase shore power -correct operation.
 hydraulic pump powered from inverter phase -inverter trip on overcurrent.
 on reconnection to shore power sporadic non-operation of pump encountered. On investigation, this was linked to high pressure loading on startup in certain conditions.
 wholesale changes to the hydraulics system proposed by local consultant, but ruled unacceptable due to time and cost.
 bypass valve and startup 'guide vane toggle' phase added to control code in place of major overhaul.
 a single-phase soft-starter was placed in series with the contactor that powered the motor.
o Tested with shore power -correct operation.
o Tested Sunny Island grid -inverter trip on overcurrent.
 3-phase machines (2.3 kW and 3 kW) used in place of single-phase machine, both caused overcurrent trips of the inverters.
 3-phase soft starter added to start sequence with similar unsuccessful results.
 3-phase motor drive with single-phase input was used to start the 3 kW motor and was successful. The single phase power draw of 2 kW was deemed too near to the inverter per phase rating of 2.2 kW, but proved that the inverters could run the motor.
 final solution was 3-phase input, 3-phase output motor drive, which proved successful with a reasonable per-phase inverter loading.
Through the troubleshooting process, it was found that the main electrical issue in driving the hydraulic power pack was related to the limitations of the Sunny Island inverters used to maintain the 3-phase island grid on the OWC. The inverters could hold a maximum output current of 25 A for a duration of 500 ms, after which they would revert to their 2.2 kW rating, which at 230 V, allows for a current of approximately 9.5 A. The inrush current required to start the electrical motors was more than the inverters could deliver. The motor drive was able to provide a soft-start controlled frequency ramp that eliminated the transient current peak.
Laboratory Testing vs. Dockside Testing
The cost of time lost during trouble shooting this and other smaller issues was much higher during onsite commissioning because of the additional expenditures related to working on site. While it is not possible to foresee and avoid all problems that can arise during on-site installation and commissioning, some of the major issues encountered during the CORES installation could have been diagnosed earlier had it been possible to bring all the systems together during laboratory testing.
However, because of wide range of partners throughout the EU, along with several hard deadlines including climate and weather windows and the availability of the tugs necessary for system deployment, not all of the equipment could be marshalled and tested together in a single laboratory.
This inability to fully coordinate everything was a major factor in many of the greater challenges encountered during installation. The first step in the deployment was the transportation of the OE Buoy from the Galway Bay dockyard to the launch location in Galway Harbour, a distance of about 1km along public roads. This operation took place on March 4 th , 2011. The OE Buoy was lifted on to the back of a low loader truck using a 100 T crane as shown in Figure 11 . Here the subsea chamber openings can be seen clearly and are divided into three separate chambers for greater support. Figure 12 shows the low loader truck transported the OE Buoy from dock yard to the launch site and also give an idea of the physical scale of the project, as the buoy can be seen against a lorry cabin. Once at the launch site, the same crane was again used to lift the device from the back of the truck into the water. This operation required extreme care so that the chambers of the OE Buoy would not fill too quickly and so overturn the crane into the water. After being successfully placed in the harbor, the OWC was allowed time for the air within the chamber to equalize. The excess air pressure causes the tilt that can be seen in the buoy as it floats in the harbour as shown in Figure 13 . The device was secured to its pre-laid moorings after which the final steps to make the device operational could be made. The OE Buoy hull platform deployed at the test site is shown in Figure   15 . The physical deployment was a resounding success, but it had to be coordinated with the availability of the land and sea transportation equipment, favorable tides, and daylight. 
Post-Deployment
The main aspects tested during the post-deployment phase of the CORES project comprised of the design and implementation of a new air turbine, electrical systems and control, mooring system, and final system deployment. The full data set from the resulting sea trials includes the following parameters: mooring loads; all air and water pressure sensors; hull motions; weather parameters; island grid electrical characteristics, power consumption, system status, and battery state of charge; wave characteristics; vibration; temperatures in generator, nacelle, guide vanes oil tank, and control room; humidity in control room; safety parameters in use; active errors (CORES, 2011).
However, even with the rigorous testing and commissioning carried out before final deployment of the CORES project, there were several issues that occurred post-deployment that resulted in lost time, lost data, and significant cost for maintenance and repair. The most prevalent and disruptive post-deployment issues included multiple failures to the on-board back-up diesel generator, rapid discharging of the battery bank, and intermittent failures of the mechanical brake and the hydraulic guide vane system.
Diesel Generator
By far, the most troublesome post-deployment problems came from the on board diesel generator.
The diesel generator served as a secondary power source for all on-board electrical systems. A cost controlling decision was made to reuse the generator from the original deployment of the OE Buoy in 2006-2008, rather than replacing it with a new generator. However, not long after deployment this proved to be a very costly decision.
Mooring Buoys
The generator was cooled using seawater that was drawn into the system through an external pipe built into the buoy. Because the generator needed a significant water supply for cooling, it could only be run for a very short period of time during the dock side integration tests, and its compatibility was not fully tested during normal commissioning. After deployment, it was found that changes to both the generator and the power system were required to allow them to operate properly as a result of system grid frequency issues. The changes required two trips to the OWC immediately after deployment, both of which should have been completely avoidable. Unfortunately, the diesel generator created more serious post-deployment problems not long after this issue was resolved.
The most significant problems related to the diesel generator were caused when the seals in the water cooling system eventually failed completely. This failure was most likely the result of the generator sitting idle for three years following its initial deployment and led directly to two major problems. The first was that the generator overheated, causing irreversible catastrophic damage to itself, and the second was that a significant amount of seawater was pumped into the control room through the broken seals in the cooling system. The water was initially the more critical issue because the bilge system had become clogged and sent an SMS alarm out warning that the buoyancy of the buoy could be compromised if action was not taken. An emergency trip was required and the water inside the buoy had to be pumped out by hand. It was not until after the control room was cleared of water and the bilge cleared of debris that the irreversible damage to the diesel generator was discovered.
The failure of the generator coupled with the short life of the battery bank meant that no testing could be conducted until the generator could be replaced. With the buoy at sea, this proved a difficult task, and a lot of time was lost exploring solutions, none of which proved ideal.
The initial solution was to use a large diesel generator mounted on the deck of the buoy that ran constantly. The deck mounted generator only lasted for a few weeks of calm weather before it also failed due to water damage cause during a storm. The second solution was to use a small diesel generator placed inside the control cabin of the buoy and run it constantly. This generator held up through the remainder of the deployment but was not without its own difficulties, including causing other problems in systems throughout the OWC and becoming an extra physical obstacle while performing already difficult operational and maintenance procedures.
Adjustments on the buoy after it was deployed were significantly more expensive and difficult to carry out for a multitude of reasons, including travel, the need for a good weather window, the cost of transportation to the buoy, and less than ideal working conditions at sea.
Turbine and Control Laws
An impulse turbine with actively movable guide vanes was used during the CORES testing produced, and it was shown to be one of the most efficient air turbine to date with average cycle efficiencies of up to 65%. The efficiency of the turbine during the sea trials was slightly higher than the efficiency predicted during laboratory testing. Along with the physical testing of the turbine, a wide range of control algorithm options that were built into the code for control of the air turbine were tested during deployment. This proved very useful in the testing phase as it maximised the value of the test program. The tests gave more understanding on the controls strategy of an impulse turbine that give at the same time a high efficiency, a reduced fluctuation of the power output and a higher protection of the power take off from over speeding. Control algorithms giving an averaged power output had a good behaviour until a high wave series created over speeding. Fixed speed tests were safe but created a high fluctuation in power production. For more information on the results from turbine and control law testing please see reference (CORES, 2011).
Energy Use and Battery Charge
The average continued power consumption of the general operation of OE Buoy during idle periods, which included the cameras, communication systems, RTIMS and SCADA systems was a continuous 250 W. This power usage could drain the batteries from the full 90% charge to below the 20% charge threshold in 22 hours. A system was put in place to use the diesel generator to turn on to recharge the battery bank when the charge dropped below 40%, and would continue to run until the batteries reached 80% full charge. Figure 16 shows the decaying battery state of charge (SOC) from above 91% to below 38% over the course of 16 hours; this was at a time when the diesel generator was unavailable to recharge the system.
Figure 16: Battery state of charge decay
If there was no secondary charging source for the power system, the inverters had a failsafe that would shutdown the AC power should the SOC drop below 20% in order to protect the batteries from complete discharge. With the SOC at 20%, the system could be restored remotely when an external source of power became available. However, with no AC power, the PTO could not be operated, and the only source on the device was then the diesel generator. Unfortunately, while the AC power could be shut down, the 24VDC systems on board could not and continued to drain the battery following the AC power shutdown. With the batteries fully discharged, the power system required a trip to the OWC by an engineer to manually restart the system.
Guide Vane Issues
The hydraulic guide vane system did not suffer any catastrophic failures during the buoy deployment, but at times the system did suffer its own difficulties. After sitting idle during calm periods, the vanes became susceptible to mild seizing and were unable to complete a stroke within the system allotted Battery SOC transition time resulting in an error being flagged by the system controller. After several minutes of operation, the guide vane mechanism would become unstuck and return to normal transition times.
Following decommissioning of the OWC, it was found that the seizing within the guide vane system was cause by damage to the vanes at the bottom of the turbine, where they were left unguarded and seawater had splashed up causing some corrosion. Figure 17 shows the difference in corrosion of the guide vane driving system, with the left an example of a guide vane which was higher on the turbine and guarded by a metal plate, while the right is an example of one located on the underside of the turbine, more near to the sea and generally unguarded.
Figure 17: Guide vane corrosion
This damage could have been minimised had the guard protecting the guide vanes been extended fully around the body of the turbine and is a simple correction for future projects. It would also be worthwhile to include in the control strategy a regular automatic transition of the guide vanes when not operating, in order to prevent salt accretion and seizing.
Complications and Costs
There were a multitude of obstacles to overcome to make any physical adjustments or perform any maintenance to systems on the buoy after deployment. Trips could only be conducted in good weather where the significant wave height (Hs) was approximately 1m or less. When there was a good weather window, a boat had to be made available and a team had to be assembled for the journey. Each trip cost approximately €1000 plus the costs of time and travel for the engineers. It should also be noted that the boat trip was relatively short (approximately 2 km) into Galway Bay in a small rigid inflatable boat. The boat trips, related down time, wave conditions and generation periods during the project can be seen in Figure 18 , while Figure 19 shows the typical boat used for the trips during boarding procedure. 
Human Impact of On-Site Maintenance
In Section 3 of this paper, the advantages and disadvantages of dockside commissioning were briefly presented and it was discussed how they affect the quality of work performed by the engineers on-site versus within the laboratory. The complications of working dockside were greatly magnified during maintenance operations following deployment of the OE Buoy.
There were obviously dangers involved with traveling to the OWC while it was deployed at sea. All personnel that would be required to make the trip must have first gone through necessary training as well as willing to accept the inherent risks involved. This meant that only trained personnel were available for maintenance trips following deployment.
Because of the constraints of travel to and from the device as well the limited space on board the OWC, only one or two engineers could make the trip at a time, thus limiting manpower and intellectual power available during a maintenance trip. The availability of necessary tools was also greatly constrained for similar reasons. The engineers were limited only to what they could safely carry with them and what could safely be left on board the OWC.
While weather and ocean reports were relied on to plan trips, they were not always accurate, and trips were cancelled dockside if it was decided that conditions were too dangerous. Working on the OWC at sea even during calm conditions was difficult, while working during safe but moderate sea conditions added an extra degree of difficulty to the work, as there was no area of the buoy that was unaffected by the rising and falling of the waves.
Due to the rapidly changing nature of the Galway Bay sea states, on-site conditions were susceptible to rapid deterioration. In such cases, trips would have to be cut short for safety reasons.
During a maintenance trip near the conclusion of the deployment window, these potential issues came together and showed how difficult the working conditions can be at sea.
Only one engineer was present during this trip, and while performing maintenance on the system, the conditions at sea began to rapidly worsen and the crew of the transport vessel was forced to end the trip early for safety reasons. However, it was discovered that the PLC had not powered back up during the system restart. Fortunately, the lead commissioning engineer for the project was on board and possessed an in-depth working knowledge of the entire electrical system. The fault in the system was quickly diagnosed and circumvented. While power was restored to the PLC and the system was again fully operational, the deteriorating conditions and the call to abandon the trip did not allow for a complete correction of the problem.
Because the solution was far less than ideal, the incident helped to highlight issues that will face future deployments of offshore devices. Any system prepared for long term deployment will require several people to be well trained for open sea safety and survival as well as trained in the electrical, mechanical, SCADA, and other on board systems in great depth to maximise the potential for quick thinking under pressure. It's also worth restating that the solution implemented for this issue would not have been acceptable had this been a long term deployment, and a second trip would have normally been required to properly correct the malfunction.
Sensors and Data
The CORES system was fitted with a comprehensive suite of sensors, as depicted in Figure 20 and Table 3 along with information on the performance of each sensor. Throughout most of the deployment, these sensors performed well and were an invaluable part of the entire CORES project.
There were only a few minor malfunctions that occurred after deployment. Notwithstanding this, the integration and post deployment phases highlighted some shortcomings in the original sensor bill of materials. Two examples of inadequate sensor deployment were in the hydraulic system that controlled the guide vanes and the mechanical braking system for the turbine. 
Hydraulic System Sensors
It was assumed in the initial design of the hydraulic system that the tank was large enough to accommodate the necessary oil cooling and therefore no oil temperature sensor was included in the original design of the control system. The hydraulic tank did have an alcohol thermometer physically mounted to the front, which can be seen in Figure 21 . During final dock site commissioning however, the decision was made to include an
Resistance Temperature Device (RTD) sensor in the oil tank that fed back to the control system in order to monitor the temperature during deployment. The RTD proved invaluable as oil temperature did at times rise to a critical level and required that the hydraulic system be shut down for a time to allow the oil to cool. The graph in Figure 22 shows the rise in oil temperature over time along with turbine speed to show the operation time of the PTO. The graph shows how the maximum oil temperature, while beginning to level off slightly, crossed the critical threshold of 60°C and also how quickly the temperature drops when the system is shutdown. The rise in temperature to such a high and unexpected level was likely due to the higher temperatures experienced in the system control room, than in the onshore tests and helped prevent what could have could have been irreversible damage to the hydraulic system. The hydraulic system also did not include a pressure sensor inside the main piping of the system. At no point during deployment did this prove to be a problem. However given the nature of the project and the wide range of data collected during deployment, it would have been useful to monitor the oil pressure and such a sensor is recommended for similar projects in the future.
Mechanical Brake Sensors
Like the cooling reservoir for hydraulic oil, the mechanical brake on the turbine was believed to be sized correctly and there was no temperature sensor on the brake. A temperature sensor was placed inside the nacelle turbine casing near the brake, but there was no such sensor on the brake pad itself.
The peak torque requirement of the brake was designed to bring the turbine to a stop during the most energetic sea states. However, it emerged that a higher torque was experienced when the turbine was at a standstill in these sea states. During high wave climates, the turbine was able to overcome the braking force, rotated and overheated the brake, distorting it and compromising its functionality.
Because of the distortion of the brake, there were times when it could not be completely released when conditions were ideal for generating and some opportunities to collect data were lost. The graph in Figure 23 shows the temperature increase recorded by the RTD placed near the brake, as well as As can be seen in Figure 23 , the temperature sensor placed near the brake only helped to confirm that the heat generated within the turbine was due to the brake and not the generator, as the reading in the RTD near the brake increased quicker than that of the RTD in the generator stator, reaching a level above 33°C. It also shows the speed of the turbine reaching upwards of 160 RPM when the brake was engaged. During normal operation, the stator temperatures rise much faster and to a much higher level than the temperature near the brake. Had there been a temperature sensor on the brake, this damage may have been avoidable, and at the very least the wear on the brake could have been documented and studied more closely. The lesson to be learned in this circumstance was the requirement for correct turbine loading data under all operational conditions.
Sensor Range and Redundancy
While the oil tank and the brake were both undersized, the load cell sensors located on each of the three mooring lines proved to be grossly oversized. They were chosen for up to 17 tonnes of force, but the largest loads experienced on any of the mooring lines was only marginally above 1 tonne. The Brake Generator resolution of the data collected by the load cells was therefore poor, and because of this, its value to the project is minimal. The maximum load force on one of the shackles can be seen in Figure 24 .
Also, the load cell located on the starboard/bow mooring line failed early on in the project and did not collect very much usable data before it failed. Conversely, sensor redundancy proved invaluable on several occasions in multiple subsystems on board the OWC. There were two speed sensors monitoring the turbine: the primary turbine speed sensor was the speed estimation from the ABB back-to-back frequency converter that controlled the generator, and the redundant sensor was a tachometer mounted on the turbine drive shaft itself. The speed estimation in the ABB converter would occasionally fail, particularly during spindown of the system in low waves, and the backup sensor was able to protect the system from overspeed, as shown in Figure 25 . Another example of the importance of sensor redundancy was with the turbine air pressure sensors. The sensors themselves were located within the control room and were connected to the turbine via plastic tubing, as shown in Figure 26 , which allowed them to measure the pressure inside the turbine while keeping them protected from the elements. After a strong storm, one of the tubes took on some water and this ingress of water into the tube compromised the sensor readings. The area where the water became trapped in the sensor layout can also been seen in Figure 26 . Because there was redundancy in these air pressure sensors, the loss of one sensor did not compromise the entire project and testing could continue uninterrupted. 
Loss of RPM Estimation
Overspeed Recorded By Tachometer
Conclusions and Recommendations
The CORES project was ultimately successful; however it was not without its problems dispite the industrial approach that was applied to the project. To a certain extent these are inevitable in a research-type project, given the uncertainties involved. However, a disciplined, phased and rigorous approach to planning, testing, documentation and design review can mitigate this risk.
The most significant lessons learned and outcomes from this project from a deployment and testing perspective can be summarized as follows:
 a phased approach to equipment testing and equipment integration is critical to risk mitigation of an offshore project in the research phase.
 installation of multiple, redundant sensors is extremely important for maximal data output and equipment protection.
 a full load profile from design data or validated simulation sets for critical components will minimize the risk of operational failure.
 cost saving through re-use of equipment will result inevitably in a net loss  operational failure risk is minimized through robust process control with a sophisticated alarm and error handling methodology.
 remote reset capability should be designed in to all control elements.
In a follow up to this project, the HMRC has begun to investigate designs for a small floating power station that would utilize renewable energy sources like solar and wind energy in parallel with the diesel generator and battery power. This will remove the 'single point of failure' issue surrounding the diesel generator supply. The availability of such a device would free wave energy developers from the burden of designing a secondary power source for their device, allowing them to
give their full focus to their core technology development. A recommendation for other non-grid connected projects is to ensure that a hybrid auxiliary power source is available to ensure that operational capability is available continuously.
This project has also spawned PhD level research in the area of real-time intregrated monitoring system and control for ocean energy conversion devices, which will focus on supervisory control and the real-time flow of live data between devices and outside sources.
In conclusion, it is hoped that the dissemination of both positives and negatives from this project will inform the research community and further the development of the ocean energy sector.
